## Three Colours of Fuzzing: Reflections and Open Challenges

### **Cristian Cadar**



Image credits: aitoff, jackmac34, Gam-Ol, JessBaileyDesign, No-longer-here, Walkerssk @ Pixabay, Powerpoint


Keynote @ FUZZING 2023 Seattle, USA, 17 July 2023

### Execution Generated Test Cases: How to Make Systems Code Crash Itself

Cristian Cadar and Dawson Engler<sup> $\star$ </sup>

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Abstract. This paper presents a technique that uses code to automatically generate its own test cases at run-time by using a combination of symbolic and concrete (i.e., regular) execution. The input values to a 2005




### **Running Symbolic Execution Forever**

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
#### SnapFuzz: High-Throughput Fuzzing of Network Applications

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2023



#### **Grammar Mutation for Testing Input Parsers** (Registered Report)


**Bachir Bendrissou** Imperial College London London, United Kingdom b.bendrissou@imperial.ac.uk

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#### Alastair F. Donaldson Imperial College London

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




#### KLEE


Open-source tool widely used in both research and industry Microsoft SAGE

Found one-third of file fuzzing bugs during development of Windows 7



#### AFL

Revolutionary greybox fuzzer with a long list of trophies **Google's OSS-Fuzz** Fuzzing platform for OSS, found 8K+ vulnerabilities and 28K+ bugs in 850+ projects



#### **Csmith and EMI**

Compiler fuzzers, discovered hundreds of bugs in mature compilers like GCC & LLVM **SQLancer** 

DBMS fuzzer, found 400+ bugs in popular DBMS like SQLite & PostgreSQL




#### COVRIG: A Framework for the Analysis of Code, Test, and Coverage Evolution in Real Software


Paul Marinescu, Petr Hosek, Cristian Cadar Department of Computing Imperial College London, UK {p.marinescu,p.hosek,c.cadar}@imperial.ac.uk

### **ISSTA 2014**

- 6 popular open-source systems
- Analysed 250 revisions per app
- Conclusion: LOTS of code added or modified without being tested


A decade later: Have things changed? Tom Bailey, C.C., WiP







## Coverage Evolution

Coverage increases by 2.8 – 22.7pp It decreases in Redis by 9.2pp









## Can Fuzzers Help?

YES, BUT...



## Not Agile Enough

- Most techniques focus on whole-program testing (it's easier!)
- Most of our benchmark suites measure global metrics (bugs, coverage)
- Good progress on patch testing techniques, but results still poor overall



### CIFuzz

- CI version of OSS-Fuzz: 10 minutes/patch
- Runs only the fuzzers that reached the changed files

OSS-Fuzz Projects	CIFuzz Runs	Crash Uploads
293	108836	1627
grok	41406	1052

According to http://cifuzz.appspot.com/, 7 July 2023 (dashboard active only for a limited time)

Great initiative, but would love to see similar

reports, trophies & <u>community attention</u> as for OSS-Fuzz

### Not Fast Enough 24h too long for patch testing

Targeted exploration

#### KATCH: High-Coverage Testing of Software Patches

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#### Targeted exploration

#### **Directed Greybox Fuzzing**

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#### Reusing previous analysis results

#### **Running Symbolic Execution Forever**

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Martin Nowack Imperial College London United Kingdom m.nowack@imperial.ac.uk Cristian Cadar Imperial College London United Kingdom c.cadar@imperial.ac.uk Reusing previous analysis results

Running only the fuzzers that reached the changed files (CIFuzz)

## Not Automated Enough

APPLICATION	OSS-FUZZ
APR	
BINUTILS	
CURL	
GIT	
LIGHTTPD	
MEMCACHED	
REDIS	
VIM	
ZEROMQ	



According to Fuzz Introspector, <u>https://introspector.oss-fuzz.com/</u>, 28 June 2023

## Not Automated Enough

APPLICATION	OSS-FUZZ	COVERAGE
APR		
BINUTILS		35.31%
CURL		5.05%
GIT		
LIGHTTPD		34.58%
MEMCACHED		
REDIS		
VIM		
ZEROMQ		



According to Fuzz Introspector, <u>https://introspector.oss-fuzz.com/</u>, 28 June 2023

## Not Automated Enough

APPLICATION	OSS-FUZZ	COVERAGE	FUZZ TARGETS
APR			
BINUTILS		35.31%	26
CURL		5.05%	20
GIT			
LIGHTTPD		34.58%	1
MEMCACHED			
REDIS			
VIM			
ZEROMQ			






Papers on improving fuzzing heuristics




Papers on test driver generation

### Improving Test Suites with Fuzzing?

<u>GNU Coreutils</u>: ls, mkdir, echo, sort, ... Overall: 84%, Average 91%, Median 95%



### Improving Test Suites with Fuzzing?




### Value of Test Cases

Quality assurance


Debugging Aid

Documentation






## Test Suites: Desired Properties



### Improving Test Suites with Fuzzing?

- In recent work, we contributed fuzzer-generated tests to the LLVM test suite (16/24 tests accepted)
- Main challenge: oracles and input minimisation



ISSTA 2023, Wed @ 14:30, Fuzzing 2 session

### Oracles



### Input Minimisation



## Oracles

Manual tests are (typically) written with good functional oracles Fuzzer-generated tests:

- Generic/crash bugs in general software (main focus in grey- and whitebox fuzzing)
- Logical bugs in software for specific domains (main focus in blackbox fuzzing)

"One fuzzing researcher of particular note is Manuel Rigger [...] Most fuzzers only look for assertion faults, crashes, undefined behavior (UB), or other easily detected anomalies. Dr. Rigger's fuzzers, on the other hand, are able to find cases where SQLite computes an incorrect answer." – SQLite webpage

> Logical bugs in general code? What is the sweet spot?

### Patch Specifications

### Specifications encoding cross-patch properties

assert(out == out prev + 1)

### Patch Specifications via Product Programs

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We need a way to make the state of both versions available to the analyser

## Product Programs

A mechanism for merging multiple program versions into a single program Used to reason about hyperproperties in a security context

- Particularly non-interference
- Product program of program P with itself

1) Can product programs work for multiple versions of a program?

2) Can they be constructed automatically for large programs?

3) Can they facilitate the writing of patch specifications?

G. Barthe, J. M. Crespo, C. Kunz, "Relational verification using product programs" Proc. of the 17th International Symposium on Formal Methods (FM'11)

## Example



Product program
x\_prev = y\_prev - 1;
x = y - 1;
z\_prev = x\_prev / 4;
z = x >> 2;

assert(z == z\_prev);

## Preliminary Experience

- We wrote patch specs for several patches from CoreBench
- CoreBench: a collection of <u>complex real-world</u> patches from popular OSS
- We constructed test drivers around the functions involved in patches
- We used AFL++ and KLEE to look for violations of the patch specs



M. Böhme and A. Roychoudhury, "CoREBench: Studying complexity of regression errors", In Proc. of the International Symposium on Software Testing and Analysis (ISSTA'14)

"Do not hard-code '/". Use IS\_ABSOLUTE\_FILE\_NAME and dir\_len instead. Use stpcpy/stpncpy in place of strncpy/strcpy."

	AFL++ and KLEE both find a spec violation:	Bug made it into a release, was reported by a user and fixed	
if (*linkname == '/') return xstrdup (linkname);	name = /a linkname = x	if (IS_ABSOLUTE_FILE_NAME (linkname)) return xstrdup (linkname);	
char const *linkbuf = strrchr (name, '/');		size_t prefix_len = dir_len (name);	
if (linkbuf == NULL)		if (prefix_len == 0)	
return xstrdup (linkname);		return xstrdup (linkname);	
size_t bufsiz = linkbuf - name + 1;		<pre>char *p = xmalloc (prefix_len + 1 + strlen (linkname) + 1);</pre>	
char *p = xmalloc (bufsiz + strlen (linkname) + 1);		<pre>stpcpy (stpncpy (p, name, prefix_len + 1), linkname);</pre>	
strncpy (p, name, bufsiz);			
<pre>strcpy (p + bufsiz, linkname);</pre>			
return p;		return p;	
		assert( strcmp(p, p_prev) == 0 );	

	AFL++ and KLEE find new spec violation:		
<pre>if (*linkname == '/') return xstrdup (linkname);</pre>	name = /x//y linkname = a	<pre>if (IS_ABSOLUTE_FILE_NAME (linkna return xstrdup (linkname);</pre>	me))
char const *linkbuf = strrchr	(name, '/');	<pre>size_t prefix_len = dir_len (name);</pre>	
<pre>if (linkbuf == NULL)   return xstrdup (linkname);</pre>		<pre>if (prefix_len == 0)   return xstrdup (linkname);</pre>	
size_t bufsiz = linkbuf - name + 1; char *p = xmalloc (bufsiz + strlen (linkname) + 1);		char *p = xmalloc (prefix_len + 1 + strlen (linkname) + 1); stpcpy (stpncpy (p, name, prefix_len + 1), linkname);	
strncpy (p, name, bufsiz); strcpy (p + bufsiz, linkname);		<pre>if ( ! ISSLASH (name[prefix_len - 1])) ++prefix_len; stpcpy (stpncpy (p, name, prefix_len), linkname);</pre>	
return p;		return p; assert( strcmp(p, p_prev) == 0 );	Code patch to fix reported bug

if (\*linkname == '/')

return xstrdup (linkname);<sup>1</sup>

```
char const *linkbuf = strrchr (name, '/');
```

```
if (linkbuf == NULL)
```

```
return xstrdup (linkname);
```

```
size_t bufsiz = linkbuf - name + 1;
```

```
char *p = xmalloc (bufsiz + strlen (linkname) + 1);
```

No more spec

is path-based

violations found

equality is used

strncpy (p, name, bufsiz);

```
strcpy (p + bufsiz, linkname);
```

return p;

```
if (IS_ABSOLUTE_FILE_NAME (linkname))
 return xstrdup (linkname);
size_t prefix_len = dir_len (name);
if (prefix len == 0)
 return xstrdup (linkname);
char *p = xmalloc (prefix_len + 1 + strlen (linkname) + 1);
stpcpy (stpncpy (p, name, prefix_len + 1), linkname);
if (! ISSLASH (name[prefix_len - 1])) ++prefix_len;
stpcpy (stpncpy (p, name, prefix_len), linkname);
return p;
```

```
assert( patheq(p, p_prev) == 0 );
```


### Oracles



### Input Minimisation




## Automated Bug Finding WITHOUT Any Input Generation



Tomasz Kuchta<sup>1</sup> · Thibaud Lutellier<sup>2</sup>  $\bigcirc$  · Edmund Wong<sup>2</sup> · Lin Tan<sup>2</sup> · Cristian Cadar<sup>1</sup>

### Examples: Chrome and Firefox Bugs





## Automated Bug Finding WITHOUT Any Input Generation

Plenty of inputs that matter: real-world, human-created

### **Oracle challenge**

• Detecting <u>meaningful</u> cross-reader inconsistencies

### **Too many bugs**

- 2% of docs crash at least one reader
- 13% of docs trigger inconsistencies


### **Too large inputs (documents)**

### PDF Domain: Solutions

- Ignore inconsistencies imperceptible to the human eye: we use CW-SSIM algorithm
- Cluster documents based on warnings and errors emitted by the readers



- Evince Chromium
- Minimise documents based on delta debugging at the level of PDF objects



### Fuzzing and the Bystander Effect Success or Failure?

### Should developers rely on fuzzers to replace test suites?

Ongoing project with Ahmed Zaki and Arindam Sharma

"xmlsec is integrated with OSS-Fuzz and is continuously fuzzed with the latest libxml2 code from the master branch. So your tests offer very little on top of that."

- libxml2 developer, listing one reason for not accepting some test contributions

Show ventries Search:				Search: xmlsec
Project name	Language 🔶	Fuzz build status	Coverage build status	Introspector build status
xmlsec	C++	● fail [log]	e fail [log]	● fail [log]



# Three Colours of Fuzzing: Reflections and Open Challenges

Fuzzing is about finding bugs

...but our objective should be to improve software

### **Key challenge:** Better integration of fuzzing into development process

- Automatically generate test drivers / fuzz targets
- Using fuzzing in an incremental fashion
- Generating inputs that trigger different behaviours across versions
- Using fuzzing to enhance test suites
- Moving beyond crash bugs