SAFEWEB

A Middleware for Securing Ruby-Based Web Applications

Petr Hosek

p.hosek@imperial.ac.uk Imperial College London

Matteo Migliavacca migliava@doc.ic.ac.uk Imperial College London

Ioannis Papagiannis ip108@doc.ic.ac.uk Imperial College London

David M. Eyers dme@cs.otago.ac.nz University of Otago david.evans@cl.cam.ac.uk University of Cambridge

Brian Shand brian.shand@cbcu.nhs.uk ECRiC, NHS

Jean Bacon jean.bacon@cl.cam.ac.uk University of Cambridge

Peter Pietzuch p.pietzuch@imperial.ac.uk Imperial College London

Data confidentiality

in enterprise web applications

Focus on applications processing sensitive data

Requirements regarding compliance with legal policies

Problem of controlling all data flows

Data protection across multiple layers at different granularities

Common threat model:

- 1. External environment is **hostile**
- 2. Application code is **not** explicitly **malicious**
- 3. Threats might be caused by **bugs** in implementation

Real-world case study

Provide web portal for accessing patient records

Make patient records accessible for review and feedback purposes


Strict security policy requirements:

- 1. Statistics & metric accessible to all staff
- 2. Patient details accessible **only** to patient treating staff

Current best practices are insufficient

Expensive and error-prone **source code auditing**

Limited exposure of collected data



- Confidential data should be protected end-to-end
 Access to confidential data by external users should be static & one-way

Contributions

SAFEWEB middleware for end-to-end data protection

Uses information flow control for data tracking Guarantees data confidentiality and integrity

Mechanisms for data tracking at different granularities Enforcement of data protection at event and variable levels

Efficient implementation using Ruby dynamic programming features

Real-world evaluation in a healthcare environment Developed & deployed in collaboration with UK National Health Service (NHS)


OUTLINE

motivation & contribution information flow control SAFEWEB architecture label propagation real-world case study evaluation conclusions

Information flow control


Protects the propagation of data

Attaching security labels to data and tracking their propagation



 $C_1 \text{ can output event iff } \subseteq \{ecric.org.uk/patient\} \subseteq \{ecric.org.uk/patient/120820455\} \\ C_2 \text{ can input event iff } \{ecric.org.uk/patient/120820455\} \subseteq \{ecric.org.uk/patient/*\} \\ \in \{e$

Bell, D., LaPadula, L.: Secure computer system: Unified exposition and Multics interpretation (1976)





Intranet

DMZ

Internet

- Confidential data should be protected end-to-end
 Access to confidential data by external users should be static & one-way





Event back-end

Support & control of unit execution

Checking and tracking events security labels Prevent units from **disclosing** confidential data


Tracking the security labels at the level of events

Simple event data model using set of key-value attribute pairs and data payload STOMP-based event protocol extended with support for security labels


Enforces unit sandboxing & isolation


Controlling the use of all I/O operations Preventing access to variables outside of local scope

> list = get 'patient_list' << event.patient puts \$patients << event.patient Accessing global variable & 1/0 operation publish /daily_report', list, :add => ['label:conf:ecric.org.uk/patient_list']



Confidential data should be protected end-to-end
 Access to confidential data by external users should be static & one-way





Intranet

DMZ

Internet

- Confidential data should be protected end-to-end
 Access to confidential data by external users should be static & one-way

Web front-end

Presents results from back-end to users

Sinatra-based web framework with traditional database-driven architecture

Enforces data flow control

Using data security labels assigned by data processing units

Taint tracking at the level of variables

Associating security labels with individual variables Checking labels on HTTP response

@name = @patient.forenames + " " + @patient.surname Taint propagation
@name.add_tags! [label:ecric.org.uk/patient/fullname']
erb "<input id='name' value='<%= @name >' />"

Label propagation

without runtime or code modification

SAFEWEB uses **unmodified** Ruby runtime

Avoiding unnecessary code transformations Simplified deployment & maintenance

Simple taint-tracking mechanism with set of **predefined** levels

Exploiting Ruby's meta-programming features Using Rubinius meta-circular Ruby VM implementation

A. Yip et al. Improving Application Security with Data Flow Assertions S. Naira et al. A Virtual Machine Based Information Flow Control System for Policy Enforcement

```
id = measurement[:id]
report = Report.new(measurement)
```

```
subscribe "/queues/measurements/#{id}/cancer_cases" do |event|
report.append event
end
```

```
subscribe '/queues/measurements/release' do |timestamp|
report.mark timestamp
publish '/queues/reports', report
end
```

Snippet of patient record aggregation logic


id = measurement[:id] report = Report.new(measurement)

SL	ubsenipe "/queues/measurements/#{id}/cancer_cases" do jevent	toin tod with
		event labels
er	nd	


subscribe '/queues/measurements/release' do |timestamp| report.mark timestamp publish '/queues/reports', report end

labels attached on publish

Snippet of patient record aggregation logic



Snippet of patient record aggregation logic



id = measurement[:id]
report = Report.new(measurement)
set id, report
subscribe "/queues/measurements/#{id}/cancer_cases" do jevent

report = get id

cet id, report

end

report.append event

tainted with event labels

subscribe '/queues/measurements/release' do [timestamp] report = get id tainted with stored data labels report.mark timestamp oublish '/queues/reports', report end labels attached on publish

Snippet of patient record aggregation logic


Real-world case study

in a healthcare organisation


Eastern Cancer Registry and Information Centre (ECRiC) Collects histories of cancer cases in the East of England

Aims to provide patient records feedback application Following the existing data protection & security requirements

Compatibility with existing production environment No changes at organisational or infrastructure level Reusing the components of existing system implemented in Ruby



Multi Disciplinary Team Feedback Portal



This applications shows the completeness of certain key data items received each month by a Trust as discussed at Multi Disciplinary Teams. By clicking on your Trust from the map above, all the relevant data will appear on the performance chart to the right. You can see the detailed patient records (you are entitled to see) by clicking on the row to expand this and see the underlying data.

Туре		Month	Hospital	Total	Date Checked	Data Completeness	
Froast	2010-11		HINCHINGBROOKE HOSPITAL (INCLUDES MI 23		23/02/2011		
NHS Number 🔶	Forename	Sumame	Address	Postcode	Date of Birth	Diagnosis Date	
143354460	Tomas	Denesik	100 Pierce Grove, West Yasmin	LG33 4FI	26/06/1977	27/11/2010	
107811786	Pietro	Gorczany	2329 Bogisich Forest, Morissettemouth	RI4 5GN	03/06/1950	14/11/2010	
188365946	Abagail	Fisher	59228 Toy Vista, Larkinbury	SK6 2QE	20/02/1964	12/09/2010	
191462777	Alexa	Stehr	6277 Micah Place, Williamsonmouth	LG89 0KU	11/02/1975	21/11/2010	
105977731	Dolly	Grant	2127 Kolby Lake,Wallacebury	LS69 OBI		21/11/2010	
134034634	Marco	Schmeler	867 April Estates,Lake Coby	PY8 9VH	21/06/19/4	29/11/2010	
162926852	Hosea	Nolan	54563 Feeney Bypass,North Dortha	BH6 1GR	13/11/1978	02/11/2010	
114622039	Domingo	Pleffer	5795 Terry Creek,New April	FO6 6AO	20/11/1972	01/09/2010	
105728923	Van	Hill	95066 Vickie Land, Geoffreyburgh	VP2 4CC	06/01/1947	03/09/2010	
173023494	Zack	Daugherty	5047 Kohler Rest, Nicolasside	EE75 OFU	24/03/1945	25/10/2010	
194606875	Buford	Hermiston	87732 Donnelly Neck, Lake Albina	YH37 3ZG	24/08/1977	24/10/2010	
194299780	Jimmie	Ernser	71845 Albertha Dale,East Deimer	LP72 6PM	02/01/1965	21/10/2010	
150007601	Savanah	Powłowski	2011 Demetris Ramp, Durganfurt	ZG80 3JB	01/02/1976	14/09/2010	
186725183	Shyanne	Kuhic	66077 Clementina Ranch, Armstrongbury	VB3 301	28/05/1962	15/10/2010	
120820455	Evalyn	Waters	90326 Jadon Stream, East Dino	BK38 4GX	10/03/1962	26/10/2010	
115405275	Marion	Hoppe	4787 Bennie View, Hudsonbury	UL5 1ZM	05/06/1963	19/11/2010	
115261382	Khali	Schamberger	9467 Kasey Mills,North Johnathon	TW83 0NO	06/05/1940	11/11/2010	
196659038	Easter	Veum	92279 Gutmann Hills, Filibertofurt	RH9 8KI	26/02/1951	17/09/2010	
182459356	Vladimir	Kozey	591 Fadel Valley,South Corrine	YH18 10C	13/09/1961	16/10/2010	
192887891	Lia	Conroy	35313 Turcotte Mount, Baumbachville	EI97 7GF	18/11/1973	16/10/2010	
3ynae	2010-11		HINCHINGBROOKE HOSPITAL (INCLUDES ML7		23/02/2011		
Haematology 2010-11 HINCHINGBROOKE HOSPITAL (INCLUD		DES MI 6	23/02/2011				
Head & Neck 2010-11 HINCHINGBROOKE HOSPITAL (INCLUDES ML0		DES MLO	23/02/2011				





NHS

Imperial College

UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE



Powered by SmartFlow Event Based Middleware. Built using the SafeWeb Architecture.

Security improvements

Prevents common vulnerabilities (from CVE database)

type of vulnerability	related CVE reports
omitted access checks	2011-0701, 2010-2353, 2010-0752
errors in access checks	2011-0449, 2010-3092, 2010-4403
inappropriate access checks	2010-4775, 2009-2431
design errors	2011-0899, 2010-3933


Only a small trusted code-base requires code audit

3121 LOC feedback portal



2841 LOC unprivileged code 280 LOC privileged code


+14% event processing latency +15% webpage rendering latency



Measured the time to handle/process 1000 requests/events

Taken on AMD Opteron 6136 2.4GHz, 16GiB of RAM, Ubuntu 10.04

-17% event processing throughput



Sampled throughput once per second for 1000 seconds

Taken on AMD Opteron 6136 2.4GHz, 16GiB of RAM, Ubuntu 10.04

- Control over data flows in enterprise web applications Data protection across multiple layers at different granularities
- Strong end-to-end security guarantees Application of information flow control to both back-end & front-end
- The importance of efficient isolation as lesson learned Necessary to ensure data protection & prevent undisclosed data leaks
- Real-world demonstration in a healthcare environment Part of a web application for assisting cancer treatment practices within the UK NHS





Related work

Taint tracking for Ruby on Rails web application framework

Burket, J., Mutchler, P., Weaver, M., Zaveri, M., Evans, D.: GuardRails: A data-centric web application security framework (2011)

Taint tracking using fine grained policy objects and source code rewriting

Yip, A., Wang, X., Zeldovich, N., Kaashoek, M. F.: Improving Application Security with Data Flow Assertions (2009)

Using Java bytecode rewriting to propagate labels

Yoshihama, S., Yoshizawa, T., Watanabe, Y. Kudoh, M. Oyanagi, K.: Dynamic Information Flow Control Architecture for Web Applications (2007)

Java thread isolation allowing communication only through labeled data Migliavacca, M., Papagiannis, I., Eyers, D., Shand, B., Bacon, J., Pietzuch, P.: High-performance event processing with information security (2010)

JVM runtime modifications to support label tracking

Roy, I., Porter, D., Bond, M., McKinley, K., Witchel, E.: Laminar: Practical fine-grained decentralized information flow control (2009)