

Deploying Dynamic Analyses and Preventing Compiler Backdoors with Multi-Version Execution

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Imperial College
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Imperial College London, UK



University of Utah, USA

Runtime Verification beyond Monitoring (ArVi)
ICT COST Action IC1402

Barcelona, March 10th, 2016

Deploying Dynamic Analysis?

Why?

`./server`

Deploying Dynamic Analysis?

Why?

```
./server
```

Segmentation fault

Deploying Dynamic Analysis?

Why?

`./server`



Deploying Dynamic Analysis?

Why?

```
valgrind --tool=memcheck server
```

```
Invalid read of size 32
```

```
by 0x40B07FF4: memcpy
```

```
(mc_replace_strmem.c:635)
```

```
by 0x40AC751B: dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
```

```
(ssl/d1_both.c:1497)
```

```
Address 0xBFFFFFF0E0 is not stack'd, malloc'd or free'd
```

Deploying Dynamic Analysis?

Why?

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valgrind --tool=memcheck server
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Address 0xBFFFFFF0E0 is not stack'd, malloc'd or free'd
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7x–57x slowdown

Deploying Dynamic Analysis?


Why?

```
gcc -fsanitize=address server.c -o server  
./server
```


```
==2268==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow  
    on address 0x629000013748 at pc 0x7f228f5f0cfa  
READ of size 32768 at 0x629000013748 thread T0  
    #0 0x43d075 in memcpy /usr/include/bits/string3.h:51  
    #1 0x43d075 in tls1_process_heartbeat ssl/t1_lib.c:2586  
    #2 0x50e498 in ssl3_read_bytes ssl/s3_pkt.c:1092  
    #3 0x51895c in ssl3_get_message ssl/s3_both.c:457  
    ...  
==2268== ABORTING
```

1.10x–2.67x slowdown


N-Version Execution




N-Version Execution







N-Version Execution




N-Version Execution




N-Version Execution




Varan




Varan




Varan




Varan




Varan




Varan




Varan




Varan




Varan



Varan



Varan



Varan

System calls


```
01
02     while (true) {
03
04         sckt = accept();           // Wait for client
05
06         req = parse(read(sckt));  // Handle request
07         file = open(req);
08         rsp = read(file);
09
10
11
12         write(sckt, rsp);         // Send response
13
14     }
15
```


Varan


System calls

```
01
02     while (true) {
03
04         sckt = accept ();           // Wait for client
05
06         req = parse(read(skt));    // Handle request
07         file = open(req);
08         rsp = read(file);
09
10
11
12         write(skt, rsp);           // Send response
13
14     }
15
```

Varan




Varan




1x–1.17x slowdown


Varan + Dynamic Analysis




Varan + Dynamic Analysis




Varan + Dynamic Analysis




Varan + Dynamic Analysis




Varan + Dynamic Analysis




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
Varan + Dynamic Analysis




Varan + Dynamic Analysis




Varan + Dynamic Analysis




Varan + Dynamic Analysis



Larger ringbuffer?



Larger ringbuffer?




Larger ringbuffer


Interactive applications

- ▶ alias **vim**='vx vim vim-asan'
- ▶ alias **htop**='vx htop htop-asan'
- ▶ alias **mutt**='vx mutt mutt-asan'
- ▶ alias **ssh**='vx ssh ssh-asan'
- ▶ alias **ls**='vx ls ls-asan'


Drop requests




Drop requests




Drop requests



Drop requests



Drop requests





Experiment



Check performance with varying drop rate on simple HTTP server

- ▶ Single process/thread
- ▶ `gcc -fsanitize=address` on follower
- ▶ BZip2 the response



Results



Results



Results



Multi-version execution for security

a or b?

```
01 int x = 1;
02
03 void f(void) {
04     if (5 % (3 * x) + 2 != 4)
05         puts("a");
06     else
07         puts("b");
08 }
```

a or b?

```
01 int x = 1;
02
03 void f(void) {
04     if (5 % (3 * x) + 2 != 4)
05         puts("a");
06     else
07         puts("b");
08 }
```

Clang 3.3 says **a**

https://llvm.org/bugs/show_bug.cgi?id=15940

sudo

```
01 htop
02 # command not found: htop
03
04 apt-get install htop
05 # Permission denied, are you root?
06
07 sudo apt-get install htop
08 # Installing...
09
10 htop
11 # running htop...
```

sudo

```
01 whoami
02 # user
03
04 sudo whoami
05 # root
```

sudo backdoor

```
01 gcc sudo.c -o sudo-gcc
02 clang sudo.c -o sudo-clang
03
04 ./sudo-gcc whomai
05 # user is not in the sudoers file.
06 # This incident will be reported.
07
08 ./sudo-clang whomai
09 # root
10
11
12
```

[https://github.com/regehr/sudo-1.8.13/tree/
compromise/backdoor-info](https://github.com/regehr/sudo-1.8.13/tree/compromise/backdoor-info)

sudo backdoor

```
01 gcc sudo.c -o sudo-gcc
02 clang sudo.c -o sudo-clang
03
04 ./sudo-gcc whomai
05 # user is not in the sudoers file.
06 # This incident will be reported.
07
08 ./sudo-clang whomai
09 # root
10
11 vx ./sudo-gcc ./sudo-clang -- whoami
12 # divergence detected, terminating
```

Cristian Cadar and Luís Pina and John Regehr, *Multi-Version Execution Defeats a Compiler-Bug-Based Backdoor*,
<http://blog.regehr.org/archives/1282>, 2015

Undefined behavior

```
01 int saturating_add(int x, int y) {  
02     if(x > 0 && y > 0 && x + y < 0)  
03         return INT_MAX;  
04     if(x < 0 && y < 0 && x + y > 0)  
05         return INT_MIN;  
06     return x + y;  
07 }
```

Undefined behavior

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```

x	y	Result
1	2	3

Undefined behavior

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06     return x + y;  
07 }
```

x	y	Result
1	2	3
1000000000	1000000000	2000000000

Undefined behavior

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06     return x + y;  
07 }
```

x	y	Result
1	2	3
1000000000	1000000000	2000000000
2000000000	2000000000	2147483647

Undefined behavior

```
01 int saturating_add(int x, int y) {  
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
x	y	gcc -O0	gcc -O2
1	2	3	3
1000000000	1000000000	2000000000	2000000000
2000000000	2000000000	2147483647	-294967296

Multi-version execution for security

- ▶ Prevents compiler backdoors
- ▶ Detects exploits based on undefined behavior
- ▶ Interesting programs:
 - ▶ Sudo
 - ▶ OpenSSH
 - ▶ Password vaults
 - ▶ GnuPG

Conclusion

- ▶ Retain performance? ✓
- ▶ Prevent backdoors? ✓
- ▶ Still detect bugs?
- ▶ Real server software?
- ▶ Other analyses?




- ▶ Luís Pina and Cristian Cadar, *Towards Deployment-Time Dynamic Analysis of Server Applications*, WODA, 2015
- ▶ Cristian Cadar and Luís Pina and John Regehr, *Multi-Version Execution Defeats a Compiler-Bug-Based Backdoor*, <http://blog.regehr.org/archives/1282>, 2015

Thank you!


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


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
Varan Implementation



Varan Implementation



Varan Implementation



Drop requests — Implementation Challenges

```
01
02     while (true) {
03
04         sckt = accept();           // Wait for client
05
06         req = parse(read(sckt));  // Handle request
07         file = open(req);
08         rsp = read(file);
09
10
11
12         write(sckt, rsp);         // Send response
13
14     }
15
```

Drop requests — Implementation Challenges

```
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07         file = open(req);
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09
10
11
12         write(sckt, rsp);         // Send response
13
14     }
15
```

Drop requests — Implementation Challenges

```
01
02     while (true) {
03         open("VARAN_DUMMY");
04         sckt = accept();           // Wait for client
05
06         req = parse(read(sckt));  // Handle request
07         file = open(req);
08         rsp = read(file);
09
10
11
12         write(sckt, rsp);         // Send response
13
14     }
15
```

Drop requests — Implementation Challenges

```
01 void http_server() {
02     while (true) {
03         open("VARAN_DUMMY");
04         sckt = accept();           // Wait for client
05
06         req = parse(read(sckt)); // Handle request
07         file = open(req);
08         rsp = read(file);
09
10         rsp = bzip2(rsp);
11
12         write(sckt, rsp);         // Send response
13
14     }
15 }
```