

KLEE's Sonar-Search

Reviewing in the context of Greybox Fuzzing


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




Agenda



Sonar-search



Compositional analysis

Greybox Fuzzing



Motivation

- Symbolic execution and fuzzing insufficient coverage => vulnerabilities not discovered
- Idea Analyze individual functions (C programs) for vulnerabilities
 - Do reachability analysis for vulnerabilities using symbolic execution
- But what about path explosion?



Targeted symbolic execution

- To tackle path-explosion
- Set targets (function entry points or vulnerable instructions in functions)
- Terminate states that do not reach targets-of-interest




- Implementation of targeted-search in KLEE KLEE22
- Target may be function-call, function-return, LLVM bb or klee_assert
- Nested searcher
 - nurs:covnew when target is reached




```
void mid() {
 // <- position of the current execution state</pre>
  return;
void foo() {
  mid();
  // <- target</pre>
void bar() {
  mid();
void entry(int a) {
  if (a > 0) // target reachable
    foo();
  else // target unreachable
    bar();
```

Three cases for sonarsearch to consider






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


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




Compositional symbolic execution with *Macke*




Real-life programs too big



Partial call-graph of Grep 2.25




Symbolic execution of isolated functions






Symbolic execution of isolated functions



Partial call-graph of Grep 2.25




Summarization of vulnerability as PC (or PC solution)



Partial call-graph of Grep 2.25



Sonar-search to vulnerable functions





Macke - Results

Program	MACKE only	both	KLEE only
bc 1.06	5	0	0
bison $3.0.4$	1	0	0
bzip $2\ 1.0.6$	0	0	0
coreutils 6.10	24	28	0
coreutils 8.25	34	4	0
diff 3.4	0	1	0
flex $2.6.0$	0	0	0
flex SIR	2	3	0
goahead 3.6.3	0	0	0
grep 2.25	0	0	0
grep SIR	0	2	0
jq 1.5	0	0	0
less 481	0	1	0
lz4 r131	0	1	0
ngircd 23	1	0	0
sed 4.2.2	0	0	0
$\tan 1.29$	0	1	0
zopfli 1.0.1	0	0	0
in total	67	41	0



Increasing function coverage with *Munch*



Symbolic execution vs. Fuzzing

- Path explosion and constraint solver in symbolic execution -> Low path coverage in "deep" parts of program
- Weak input (mutation) strategy with fuzzing -> Low path coverage everywhere.
- Idea: Greybox fuzzing (symbolic execution + fuzzing)



Munch - Greybox Fuzzer for Function Coverage

FS hybrid

- Fuzzing for limited time
- List uncovered functions
- Sonar-search to uncovered functions

SF hybrid

- Symbolic execution (KLEE default strategy) for limited time
- Fuzzing with seed inputs generated by KLEE




Munch - Results

• 9 C-programs (⊂ Macke)

Technique	Time	
Munch FS	~ 2 hours	
Munch SF	2 hours	
Symbolic execution	5 hours	
Fuzzing	5 hours	




Munch - Results



■ Average function coverage (%)




Munch - Results



O Symex ○ Fuzzing ○ Munch SF ○ Munch FS

Conclusion

- Sonar-search (KLEE22) for targeted symbolic execution
- Two use-cases of sonar-search
 - Compositional analysis of C programs
 - Greybox fuzzing to increase function coverage
- Compositional analysis performs better in terms of vulnerability discovery than symbolic execution
- Greybox fuzzing performs better in terms of function coverage, than symbolic execution or blackbox fuzzing.





References

- Ognawala, S., Ochoa, M. et al. "MACKE: Compositional analysis of low-level vulnerabilities with symbolic execution." *Automated Software Engineering (ASE), 2016*
 - https://github.com/tum-i22/macke
- Ognawala, S., Hutzelmann, T. et al. "Improving Function Coverage with Munch: A
 Hybrid Fuzzing and Directed Symbolic Execution Approach." Symposium for Applied
 Computing (ACM SAC), 2018
 - https://github.com/tum-i22/munch
- KLEE22 with Sonar-search https://github.com/tum-i22/klee22 (branch "sonar")
- Severity assessment tool https://vmpretschner18.informatik.tu-muenchen.de/
- ognawala@in.tum.de